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Erfurt Quarto 290 includes two commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Timothy B. Noone established the attribution to Richard Rufus of Cornwall
of the commentary that appears on folios 1–40,1 chiefly on the basis of a
thirteenth-century ascription to Richard Rufus, deciphered by Fr. Leonard
Boyle; the aim of this essay is to show that the author of the commentary on
folios 46–56 is also Richard Rufus. Since the manuscript itself was copied
before 1250, both commentaries are clearly early. Noone calls the commen-
tary on folios 1–40, the Scriptum, but that seems misleading since Noone also
claims that what we have is a record preserved by its auditors, a reportatio (p.
65). And in medieval scholarly practice, a reportatio is distinguished from a
scriptum, which is a written version corrected by the author and meant for
publication. In order not to prejudice the question whether this commentary
is reportatio or a scriptum, we will call it the Dissertatio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis,
taking the term ‘Dissertatio’ from the work’s incipit (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 1ra):
“Placet nobis nunc parumper disserere de quadam propositione quam dicit Aristoteles
in ‘Veteri Philosophia.’” Rufus cites the Dissertatio as the work of a secular
author,2 so it must have been written before he became a Franciscan in 1238.
The shorter, more primitive commentary found on folios 46–56 probably
dates from around 1235, but the basis for that claim will be stated at the end
of this paper. Most of this essay is devoted to establishing the attribution of
the earlier commentary to Rufus, chiefly on the basis of comparisons with
Rufus’s Dissertatio in Metaph. and his “De intellectu divino.”
Rufus’s first Metaphysics commentary, which we will call the Memoriale
quaestionum Richari Rufi in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Mem.), begins with the
words:
Quoniam temporis interruptione brevissima scientia laboriose adqui-
sita ab anima relabitur humana, attestante philosopho quod omnium
habere memoriam et in nullo peccare magis est divinae condicionis
1. T. Noone “An Edition and Study of the Scriptum super Metaphysicam, bk. 12,
dist. 2,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1987).
2. Gál, G., “Commentarius in Metaphysicam Aristotelis cod. Vat. lat. 4538, fons
doctrinae Richardi Rufi,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 43 (1950):214–15.
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quam humanae, ne igitur tenebris ignorantiae mens avida, conclusa
mole carnis, profundius obfuscetur, sub quarum velamine famosarum
maxime quaestionum veritas lateat non investigata, quae per locorum
spatia diffuse distenditur amplissima, licet nobis parumper de ipsa
disserere, ut ipsius habeatur memoriale.
The text ends with a complete sentence—“Unde licet opposita intelliguntur
insimul ab intelligente, non tamen oportet quod sint simul in se extra in
re”—though there is no resounding conclusion. A different, much later,
hand has continued the text in mid-column, with the words, “Item, sequitur.”
Whether that sentence is meant to link our commentary to what is now the
next column on the next quire is by no means clear, but it seems unlikely
that the two texts belong together. The quires on which the commentary
appears are unnumbered. The first is complete (eight folios). The second
was intended to be only half the usual length (four folios), which indicates
that the scribe planned to complete the work about where it now ends.
Since the last quire is missing its last leaf, however, we do not know whether
the work is complete. It may be incomplete, but if so, little has been lost.
Like Rufus’s other early commentaries, the Memoriale is principally
comprised of brief questions based on the Aristotelian text or on Averroes’
commentary. So brief are most of these questions that only three of the
eleven books  are more  than  one  folio  long. By  far  the  longest is the
commentary on its last book, book Lambda.
Transcribed in the fall of 1996 from Erfurt Q 290 f.46ra–55vb, the first
reason to attribute this work to Rufus was its presence in the Ave Maria
Aristotle quires (Erfurt Q290 and Q312),3 which contain other works by
Rufus. Once it was clear that it was a Metaphysics commentary, there was a
further reason for the attribution: We know that Rufus wrote two Metaphysics
commentaries. In his Dissertatio in Metaph., he refers to a previous Physics
commentary,4 and the Physics commentary refers in turn to a previous
Metaphysics commentary. Consequently, when we had completed the tran-
scription, we checked the Physics reference to Rufus’s first Metaphysics com-
mentary, hereafter Mem. In Physics IV, Rufus says:
Ulterius intelligendum quod esse mutabile non addit novam naturam
super esse simpliciter. Propterea dicimus quod simul debet fieri tracta-
tio de ente primo et ente simpliciter, sicut in Philosophia prima loquor
de causato. (Q312.8ra)
This reference led us to look for discussions of caused entities in general,
which we found. For example, at the end of book IV, Rufus speaks generally
3. Cf. “Richard Rufus’s Speculum animae: Epistemology and the Introduction of
Aristotle in the West,” in Die Bibliotheca Amploniana im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelis-
mus, Nominalismus und Humanismus, ed. A. Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 23 (Ber-
lin, 1995), pp. 86–109.
4. R. Wood, “Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Aristotle’s Physics,” Franciscan
Studies 52 (1992):247–81.
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about all  caused things,  abstracting  from  whether  they  are created or
generated:
Mem. IV: Quaeritur utrum contradictoria possunt simul esse in
eodem. Quod sic videtur, quia . . . omne causatum inquantum est ab
agente habet esse, inquantum fit ex nihil habet non esse . . .
Ad primum dicendum quod esse quod accipitur a causa efficiente
destruit non esse, quod vero a causa materiali ponit non esse. Ponit
enim non manere causatum de natura propria cum esse quod recepit
ab efficiente, et ita patet ad primum. . . .
Et nota quod contradictorie opposita sunt termini generationis et
creationis sed differenter . . . (Q290.47rb)
In book XI, Rufus tells us that caused things are posterior to their causes,
both naturally and temporally: “Primum est notabile quod efficens praecedit
causatum prioritate temporis et naturae . . .” (Q290.52va). He adds that caused
things owe their entity to causes: “Unde non-entitas refertur ad causatum, entitas
autem attribuitur causae cui praeterita et futura sunt praesentia . . .” (Q290.55va).
Clearly, the author of the Memoriale does discuss “caused things” in
abstraction from particular caused things. So we looked for further evi-
dence that might confirm or disconfirm the attribution—namely, for simi-
larities and dissimilarities with known works by Rufus.
COMPARISON WITH RUFUS’S DISSERTATIO
IN METAPH. COMMENTARY
The obvious place to start was with Rufus’s principal Metaphysics commen-
tary, his Dissertatio in Metaph. (Diss.). The two commentaries are divided into
the same eleven books, ending with Lambda, and lacking Kappa; the same
translation is employed—the “nova” by Michael Scot which accompanies
Averroes.
Aristotle is repeatedly named, but seldom referred to as “the Philoso-
pher”: indeed, one reference in the early commentary to the “Philosopher”
turns out to be a citation of Boethius (VII Q290.49vb). Only twice cited by
name, as “Aweroys” or “Averoys,” Averroes is commonly called “the Com-
mentator.” In discussing Saturn, both commentaries refer to the Greek as-
tronomers Eudoxus and Callippus as “Oditius” and “Kilonius” (Q.290 39ra
and 54ra).5
The statements of purpose with which the works begin employ an un-
usual turn of phrase “parumper disserere de”—a similarity that is shared with a
third work:
Mem. I: . . . licet nobis parumper de ipsa disserere, ut ipsius habeatur
memoriale, . . . (Q290.46ra)
5. Noone (op. cit. p. 165 and 261) reads Rilonius and notes the irregular
spelling.
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Diss. I: Placet nobis nunc parumper disserere de quadam propositione
quam dicit Aristoteles in veteri Philosophia (Vat. lat. 4538.1ra)
Contra Averroem (CAv): Liceat nobis parumper disserere de quibusdam
verbis ipsius philosophi Averrois . . . (Q312.81va)
More important are the shared views. For instance, Rufus defends the
claim that there is a plurality of divine ideas, illustrating it with a charac-
teristic example in which God’s mind is compared with a corporeal mirror.
This simile is employed in a number of Rufus’s works, including the two
Metaphysics commentaries, as comparison shows:
Mem. XI: . . . Et propterea intelligendo se intelligit omnia relucentia in
ipso sicut in speculo. Et exemplum conveniens est ad hoc: si universum
in aliquo speculo describeretur, aliquis inspiciendo speculum non solum
intelliget speculum, immo etiam universum in ipso descriptum . . .
(Q290.54vb)
Diss. XI l.7 q.9: . . . Et ut magis illud intelligamus, ponamus exemplum
in rebus corporalibus sic. . . . Ponamus igitur per impossibile quod
omnia visibilia per unum idolum sunt visibilia. . . Manifestum est quod si
quis aspiceret  in  illo  speculo, diceret se unum solum videre. . . .
(N1987.304–305)
Similarly characteristic is Rufus’s defense of Plato’s views on universals
against Aristotle. An important element of this defense is the claim that
Aristotle misinterpreted Plato by mistakenly ascribing to him the view that
universals existed separately not only without matter, but apart from any
soul. Rufus understands Plato to hold only the view that forms can exist as
ideas without being individually instantiated in matter, distinct from sensi-
ble objects: Rufus says that Aristotle “imposed on Plato” the doctrine of
separated forms apart from the soul. According to Rufus, this distortion
enabled Aristotle to employ the so-called “third man” argument against
Plato, an infinite regress argument which claims that Plato is committed to
positing forms of forms:
Mem. VII: Quod non per se extra animam et materiam hoc probat
Aristotelem, quia ponere hoc est ponere formas separatas, sicut Aris-
toteles imponit Platoni. (Q290.48rb)
Diss. I: Ponit et aliam increpationem, dicens quod Plato perscrutabatur
‘de communitate individuorum inter se’, et posuit ideas separatas ab
istis et nullam naturam esse praedicabilem de ipsis, similiter debuisset
facere [de] eis speciebus, scilicet ponere ideam eis, et similiter aliam in
superioribus, et ita ut essent idearum idea et formarum forma. Non
autem fecit, et ideo bene solvit. Non enim posuit nisi formas separatas
a sensibilibus vel ideas. (Q290.4vb)
Not Aristotle but Plato understood universals correctly according to Rufus.
Properly speaking, the term ‘universal’ refers to ideas in the mind; it refers
only secondarily to the kind of form which combines with matter. The
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disagreement between Aristotle and Plato on universals, Rufus attributes to
ambiguity in the use of the term ‘universal’. Plato employs it properly to
refer to forms in the intellect or ideas; less properly Aristotle refers to forms
which exist outside the mind.6 The difference between the two philoso-
phers is succinctly stated in a discussion of ideas, written after the Memoriale
and before the Dissertatio, the first question in Rufus’s Contra Averroem.
CAv I: Erit igitur et ipsa forma-natura universale, et in hac acceptatione
accipit Aristoteles et sui sequaces hoc nomen ‘universale’. Plato autem
et sui sequaces hoc nomen ‘universale’ accipiunt praecise pro forma-
idea, et non pro forma-natura, et haec videtur contrarietas esse inter
hos philosophos . . . ut mihi videtur omnino limpidius inspexit et stric-
tius secutus est impositionem nominis qui ideae huius nominis imposi-
tionem attribuit. (Q312.83ra)
In commenting on the Metaphysics, Rufus makes much the same point,
echoing the words of the early commentary in the later one.
Mem. VII: Dicendum quod secundum propriam acceptionem huius
nominis ‘universale’ significat universale esse formae quod habet in
intellectu, hoc est prout ipsa est species vel similitudo rei. Forma tamen
cuius esse vocatur in anima per hoc nomen ‘universale’ est extra ani-
mam et in materia. Unde ipsa est res et intellectus, et ipsa exsistens
intellectus est similitudo eiusdem prout est forma rei et inquantum est
similitudo.
Unde proprie accipendo hoc nomen ‘universale’ dicendum est quod
non habet esse nisi in anima solum. Quia tamen Aristoteles non solum
dicit formam esse universale prout habet esse in anima, sed prout habet
esse extra animam, et hoc sive ipsa consideretur inquantum est in
multis et non in singulis sive consideretur inquantum est in singulis,
ideo potest dici universale habere esse in anima et extra animam.
(Q290.48va)
Diss. VII: Ad hoc dicendum quod secundum propriam acceptionem
huius nominis ‘universale’ significat universale esse formae quod habet
in intellectu, hoc est prout est species sive similitudo rei. Forma tamen
cuius  esse notatur in  anima per hoc nomen ‘universale’ est extra
animam et in materia. Unde ipsa est res et intellectus, et ipsa exsistens
intellectus est similitudo eiusdem prout est forma rei; et in quantum
est similitudo significatur per hoc nomen ‘universale.’
Unde  proprie  accipiendo hoc nomen  ‘universale’  dicendum  est
quod universale non habet esse nisi in anima. Quia tamen Aristoteles
dicit formam non solum universale prout habet esse in anima, sed
etiam prout habet [esse] extra animam, et hoc sive ipsa consideretur
in quantum est in multis sive consideretur in singulis, ideo potest dici
6. For a further discussion of Rufus’s Platonism, see “Richard Rufus and the
Classical Tradition,” in Neoplatonisme et philosophie medievale, ed. L. Benakis, Rencon-
tres de philosophie medievale 6 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 229–51.
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universale habere esse in anima et extra animam, et sive sit commune
multis sive praedicabile de singulis. (Q290.21va)
This  theory  of  universals,  and  the defense  of Plato  it includes, is not
espoused by any author other than Rufus to the best of our knowledge.
Less distinctive, as far as we know, are Rufus’s views on names. Oddly
enough, both Metaphysics commentaries include a gloss on Priscian’s view
that names signify substance and quality. Moreover, as in the discussion of
universals, the Dissertatio quotes from the Memoriale. The questions begin in
the same way:
Mem. VIII: Quaeritur an omne nomen significet substantiam cum
qualitate, sicut dicitur an non.
Et videtur quod non:
Nam si sic, hoc nomen ‘homo’ cum sit nomen significat substantiam
cum qualitate. Vocetur illa substantia A et vocetur qualitas B. A est
nomen, ergo significat substantiam cum qualitate; nominetur illa quali-
tas C et convenit procedere ut prius, et sic in infinitum. (Q290.49vb)
Diss. VIII: Sed potest quaeri quid signficet nomen, et si substantiam
cum qualitate, ut vult Priscianus quaeratur utrum omne nomen signi-
ficet substantiam cum qualitate, et quid appellatur substantia et quid
qualitas cum dicitur nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate.
Et videtur quod non omne nomen significet substantiam cum quali-
tate . . .
Nam si sic, ergo  hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat substantiam cum
qualitate. Nominetur illa qualitas nomine A et substantia nomine B. A
est nomen, ergo significat substantiam cum qualitate; nominetur illa
qualitas nomine C, et procedatur sicut prius, et erit processus in infini-
tum. (Q.29023vb)
They both reject the same opinion:
Mem. VIII: Dicunt quidam quod cum dicitur nomen significare sub-
stantiam cum qualitate quod illa substantia est quoddam aggregatum
ex forma speciei et substantia materiae; forma autem speciei dicitur
qualitas, et substantia contrahitur a materia sive a genere quod est loco
materiae.
Sed ista solutio non habet locum nisi in nominibus significantibus
substantiam compositam, ut hoc nomen ‘homo’. Unde adhuc remanet
haec quaestio solvenda in nominibus dicentibus substantiam simplicem
ut hoc nomen ‘lux’, quoniam difficile est in talibus diversitatem sub-
stantiae et qualitatis apprehendere. (Q290.49vb)
Diss. VIII: Et si quis dicat quod cum dicitur “nomen significare substan-
tiam,” illa substantia est aggregatum ex forma speciei et substantia
materiei. Forma autem speciei dicitur qualitas, et hoc manifeste patet
in hoc nomine ‘homo.’ . . .
Sed haec solutio non habet locum nisi in nominibus significantibus
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substantiam compositam. Unde adhuc remanet quaestio solvenda in
nominibus significantibus substantiam simplicem, ut in hoc nomine
‘nix’. Quid igitur appellatur qualitas, et quid substantia? (Q290.23vb)
But the later commentary, the Dissertatio, also rejects the solution tentatively
advanced in the early commentary.
Mem. VIII: Dici tamen potest quod eadem est substantia et qualitas in
huius nominibus secundum rem, diversa tamen secundum rationem.
Dicitur enim significare substantiam inquantum habet naturam
subiciendi, qualitatem vero inquantum habet naturam praedicandi.
Verbi gratia: sit A nomen simplex, si dicam A est A, idem est quod
subicitur et quod praedicatur, tamen signficatum huius nominis A
prout subicitur est substantia, prout praedicatur est qualitas. Sic igitur
in omnibus nominibus tam simplicibus quam compositis est invenire
substantiam et qualitatem. (Q290.49vb)
Diss. VIII: Ad hoc autem potest quis respondere quod in aliquibus
nominibus, utpote in illis quae significat substantiam compositam, se-
cundum rem differunt substantia et qualitas, in aliquibus non differunt
secundum rem sed solum secundum modum. Ens enim et esse idem
sunt secundum rem, sed differunt secundum modum in nomini-
bus. . . . Sed illud dicitur substantia inquantum habet naturam
subiciendi et qualitas inquantum habet naturam praedicandi. Verbi
gratia: sit A nomen simplex. Si dicam “A est A,” idem est quod subicitur
et quod praedicatur, tamen significatum huius nominis A prout subici-
tur est substantia, prout autem praedicatur est qualitas. Sic igitur in
omnibus nominibus, tam simplicibus quam compositis, est invenire
substantiam et qualitatem.
Sed contra: ista est diversitas quae est secundum modum et quae
invenitur in significato nominis simplicis, aut solum causatur ab intel-
lectu nostro aut isti diversitati correspondet aliqua diversitas in re extra
animam . . . (Q290.23vb–24ra)
COMPARISON WITH “DE INTELLECTU DIVINO”
In the course of comparing the two Metaphysics commentaries, we have al-
ready seen similarities with a number of other works—chiefly, with the inter-
mediate Contra Averroem. Although we cannot make comparisons with every
other work, we must consider one other work: Rufus’s “De intellectu divino”
(IDiv). Though it is a minor work, like the Dissertatio, it is explicitly ascribed
to Rufus by a thirteenth-century hand in the manuscript where it is pre-
served, Assisi Bibl. Com. 138.7 Since it is so short, there are comparatively few
7. Doucet, V., Prolegomena, in Summa Halesiana IV p.1, Quaracchi 1948, Typo-
graphia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, p. 141.
EARLIEST KNOWN METAPHYSICS COMMENTARY 45
points of comparison, but three similarities in doctrine can be adduced. First,
both works teach that the First Cause knows everything by knowing itself.
Contrary to the opinion Rufus was to defend later,8 they follow Averroes and
deny that the First Cause knows others, and they argue for that position by
pointing to the dissimilarities between our knowledge and that of the First
Cause: We know passively and by reception; not so, the First Cause.
IDiv: Ad ista potest probabiliter responderi quod istud nobile primum
nihil extra se intelligendo, se intelligens omnia verissime intelligit. Et
hoc, ut dicunt quidam, intelligit Aristoteles probare in prima parte
illius capituli, Scientia autem patrum (12.8.1074b13). Nec addit forte
secundum rem hic quod intelligit omnia et quod se intelligit. . . . Ideo
addendum [est] quod ipse intelligit non per receptionem, quia nullius
speciem vel formam recipit, cum non sit receptivum, cum omne recep-
tivum sit in potentia. Nec se ipsum intelligit recipiendo, cum sit ipse
actus purus . . . diversificet suam cognitionem a nostra, scilicet cog-
noscere non per receptionem. (A138.262vb)
Mem. XI: Aliter dicitur sic: quod Primum tantum intelligit se ipsum, et
tamen intelligendo se ipsum intelligit omnia, quia in ipso relucent
omnia sicut in speculo.
Ratio Aristotelis quae probat quod Primum non intelligit alia a se per
receptionem est ista: si intelligeret alia a se,  perficeretur per  per
ea—quod est inconveniens. Sic enim intelligit intellectus noster, scilicet
per receptionem, et ideo per recepta perficitur. Non contingit autem
de intellectu Primi, quia non intelligit per receptionem sed per se
ipsum. (Q290.54vb–55ra)
Another fairly common position defended in both works is that the
First Cause knows matter by privation:
IDiv: Et dici potest quod sicut intelligimus materiam per privationem
formae, sic et ipse per privationem similiter. (A138.262vb)
Mem. XI: Et ideo potest dici quod materia prima magis cognoscitur per
privationem sive per modum privationis quam per modum positionis.
Et ideo si intelligeretur, intelligeretur per ideam privationis quam non
est ponere in Primo. Unde potest dici quod Primum cognoscit primam
materiam, non tamen per ideam suam in ipso exsistentem, sed per
cognitionem positionis formae cognoscit materiam primam. Et con-
similiter est dicere de omnibus privationibus quod cognoscuntur cog-
nitis suis habitibus. (Q290.55rb)
As is clear, however, the treatment in the early Metaphysics commentary is
more qualified and more sophisticated: We cannot exactly say that the First
8. R. Wood, “Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Rich-
ard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus.” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 7–46./m no. 9 Gál, G.
“Opiniones Richardi Rufi a censore reprobatae,” Franciscan Studies 35
(1975):136–93.
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Cause knows by privation, since privation is not to be posited in the First
Cause. So we say instead that in so far as matter is privation, it is known by
knowing the corresponding habit. The two works suggest the same strategy:
understanding an absence by knowing something present. But the second
shows more theological sophistication.
Rufus on enuntiables presents a similar case. The doctrine is similar:
In “De intellectu divino,” Rufus holds that enuntiables about God are true
from eternity, but since they are relations that have no existence apart from
their extremes, we need not posit more than one eternal being. In com-
menting on the Metaphysics, however, Rufus defends a more general conclu-
sion to cover other eternal truths—for example, that triangles have three
sides: From the fact that many enuntiables are true from eternity, it does
not follow that there are a plurality of beings, since God’s knowledge does
not depend on beings.
IDiv: Item, qualiter enuntiabilia sint ab aeterno, ut Deum-esse et
Deum-esse-esse-verum. Videtur mihi quod enuntiabilia non dicit ali-
quid sed solummodo relationem extremorum. Unde Deum-esse non
est alia essentia a Deo. (A138.262vb)
Mem. XI: Dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen sunt
plura enuntiabilia ab aeterno vera. Nec tenet hoc argumentum: enun-
tiabilia plura sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno. (Q290.48rb)
We know that Rufus did not abandon the position on relations held in
“De intellectu divino.” As Gedeon Gál pointed out, in his last known work,
the Paris Commentary,9 Rufus held that relations do not signify anything
apart from the relata. Still the IDiv position does not explain why truths
unrelated to God do not require that we posit eternal beings other than
God. Perhaps that is why he revised his view. At any rate, in the later
Dissertatio, Rufus adopts the position of the Memoriale, which he repeats
word for word:
Mem. VII: Dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen sunt
plura enuntiabilia ab aeterno vera. Nec tenet hoc argumentum: enun-
tiabilia plura sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno.
Ad argumentum in oppositum dicendum quod verum quoddam
cadit in cognitione nostra, et illud verum cadit sub ente et ad ipsum
sequitur. Et si accipiatur hoc modo verum, non est haec propositio
vera: ‘Enuntiabilia sunt ab aeterno vera’. Est autem aliud verum quod
cadit in cognitione primae causae, et istud verum non est sub ente, nec
ad illud verum sequitur ens, et illo modo veri sunt enuntiabilia vera ab
aeterno, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sint ab aeterno. (Q290.48rb)
9. Gál, G. “Opiniones Richardi Rufi a censore reprobatae,” Franciscan Studies
35 (1975):136–93.
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Diss. VII: Ad aliud dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen
sunt plura enuntiabilia vera ab aeterno. Nec tenet hoc argumentum:
enuntiabilia sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno.
Ad argumentum in oppositum, dicendum quod verum quoddam
cadit in cognitione nostra, et illud verum cadit sub ente, et ad ipsum
sequitur ens. Et si accipitur hoc modo ‘verum’, non est haec propositio
vera: Enuntiabilia sunt vera ab aeterno. Est autem aliud verum quod
cadit in cognitione primae causae, et illud verum non est sub ente nec
ad illud verum sequitur ens, et illo modo sunt enuntiabilia vera ab
aeterno, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sint ab aeterno. (Vat. lat.
4538.51rb–va)
ATTRIBUTION TO RICHARD RUFUS
While more similarities could be adduced, these should suffice. The evi-
dence for the authenticity of the early Metaphysics commentary is over-
whelming: It appears in a Rufus manuscript. It contains passages that are
repeated word for word in a work explicitly ascribed to Rufus in the thir-
teenth century, Rufus’s Dissertatio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis. It defends many
of the views Rufus held, including several defended by no other author as
far as we know. Moreover, it shares important stylistic similarities with other
works by Rufus.
DATING
Having established the attribution of the early Metaphysics commentary to
Rufus, we should say a little more about its date. The most important result
of the foregoing discussion in that regard comes from the comparison with
“De intellectu divino.” Both the greater sophistication of the early Metaphys-
ics commentary and its closer resemblance to the Dissertatio suggests that it
was not Rufus’s first work. The magistral question, “De intellectu divino”
preceded it. And as we knew at the outset, the Physics Commentary came
later. So we know something about the relative chronology. The order is:
“De intellectu divino,” Memoriale, “In Physicam Aristot.,” Dissertatio.
The absolute chronology is more elusive, however. The main dating
tool we have is Rufus’s quotation of the Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. as the
work of a secular author, meaning it is a work produced before the spring
of 1238, when Rufus became a Franciscan. So the date of the Dissertatio is
probably around 1237. If we allow a couple years for other works, we may
suppose that the Memoriale was not produced before 1235. If we also assume
that Rufus did not follow the example of the Parisian masters who began
teaching the libri naturales in 1231 before the commission to expurgate
48 REGA WOOD
them had been appointed,10 then the likelihood is that it is probably closer
to 1235 than 1231.
Thus the newly discovered commentary is at least two years earlier,
perhaps as much as sixteen years earlier, than Roger Bacon’s Metaphysics
commentaries, which were produced some time between 1237 and 1247.11
Taking the date usually assigned, 1245,12 the newly discovered commentary
is at least a decade earlier than Bacon’s. Produced quite early in his teaching
career at Paris,13 Bacon’s commentaries on the Metaphysics are the only
other surviving commentaries that may have been produced before 1240.
By contrast, Adam Buckfield’s commentary must have been written after
1243 and is usually dated about 1250.14 So Rufus’s newly discovered com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the first surviving Western medieval
commentary of which we know.15 It is the earliest evidence we have on how
Aristotelian metaphysics was taught at the medieval University.
10. H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chartularium Univ. Paris. n. 86 (Paris, 1889),
I:143.
11. J. Hackett, “Scientifia Experimentalis: From Robert Grosseteste to Roger
Bacon,” in Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives, ed. J. McEvoy, (Steenbrugis, 1995), p.
95.
12. A. Zimmermann, “Some Aspects of the Reception of Aristotle’s Physics and
Metaphysics in the Thirteenth Century,” in Ad litteram, ed. M. Jordan and K. Emery,
(Notre Dame, Ind.: 1992), p. 220.
13. Bacon, Quaestiones supra libros octo Physicorum Aristot., ed. F. Delorme and R.
Steele, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi 13 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1935), p. xxx.
14. A. Maurer, “Adam of Buckfield, Sententia super secundum Metaph., in Nine
Mediaeval Thinkers, ed. J. Reginald O’Donnell, C.S.B. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1955), p. 99.
15. For indications that Aristotle’s Metaphysics was taught earlier, cf. A. Gabriel,
“Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Mediaeval Universities,” in Garlandia (Frankfurt
a. M.: Josef Knecht, 1969), pp. 201–9.
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